The idea is simple: probabilities don’t make any sense as tools for explaining the brain, they make sense as tools for describing what is literally possible. Describing what is possible and what is likely in the physical universe is awesome, I’m all for it. It’s cool that we can understand particle physics which may or mayContinue reading “Probability as a Mental Model is Bullshit”
Category Archives: Uncategorized
Concepts Are Tools, Not Artifacts
The delightful John Nerst points out that we have more of a problem organizing and moving around knowledge than we do creating it. I think we need a Conceptual Logistics that tells us what kind of patterns people have observed over the centuries, how they relate to each other, and where we can find evidenceContinue reading “Concepts Are Tools, Not Artifacts”
Other Kinds of Inference
In 1822 some people in what is now Germany were like: “Yo, isn’t that an African arrow in that stork’s neck?” Sure enough it was, and this lead to a lot of progress on the question of “Where the hell do birds go when they’re not here, anyway?” All in all it was a greatContinue reading “Other Kinds of Inference”
Wireheading is a Teleological Misnomer
As the mistaken belief that AGI is “coming up” on our horizon increases, the discussion around “wireheading” has increased in fervor. The idea is very simple: What if you designed a robot to mow your lawn, by making sure it gets orgasms from well-cleaned lawns? Except you botch up the entire thing by making theContinue reading “Wireheading is a Teleological Misnomer”
Functionally Pragmatic Salesmanship
Crispy Chicken isn’t my real name, though CC are my initials. Perhaps keeping my initials in my pseudonym was foolish, and perhaps I’m foolish for revealing it now, at the beginning of the end of the American defense of radical openness on the internet. But I want to tell you why it was important forContinue reading “Functionally Pragmatic Salesmanship”
Rare and Well-Known Objects
If something is rare to possess and well-known, it is being coordinated around. If it did not acquire both of these properties at once, it was either rare at first or well-known at first. If it was rare at first, then become well-known it was used to coordinate and that proliferated it. If it wasContinue reading “Rare and Well-Known Objects”
Miscellaneous Musings on Language
What does it mean to say “She motioned me to come forward.” This is the thing, above every example I have seen, that should make us suspicious about any definite notion of “meaning”. — The idea of meaning started as arguments over a ledger—the ledger is what people agree has been spoken. Previously, to winContinue reading “Miscellaneous Musings on Language”
How Should We Describe How Language Works?
This is a guest post from Wrench, who I’m working with along with a few others to develop the Inexact Sciences. The point of science and theory is to sculpt out useful idealized machinery to make thinking about very complex systems tractable. People always point to physics for this because they’ve gotten the best ratioContinue reading “How Should We Describe How Language Works?”
Functional Transmission Theory
Again and again people trying to do anything complicated for a long period of time are beset by the same issue: What do our words refer to, since they clearly don’t refer to truth conditions of the person who originally wrote them? The answer is that “refer” is a misnomer, and it’s an especially confusingContinue reading “Functional Transmission Theory”
Expanding the In-Group Won’t Solve Your Problem
Anyone with ambition has felt the difficulty of attempting to get where they’re going because they’re not “in” with the right groups. Much reform today is directed at making things meritocratic by attempting to quantify potential and using metrics to control power structures. Of course these metrics are largely applied to the decision to acceptContinue reading “Expanding the In-Group Won’t Solve Your Problem”